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Chapter 5 





Operations of collection, processing and structuration of data for purposes1 of datamining and 
profiling, helping individuals and organizations to cope with circumstances of uncertainty or 
relieving them from the burden of interpreting events and taking decision in routine, trivial 
situations have become crucial to public and private sectors' activities in domains as various 
as crime prevention, health management, marketing or even entertainment.2  
The availability of new ICT interfaces running on algorithmically produced and refined 
profiles, indiscriminately allowing for both personalization (and the useful, safe and 
comfortable immersion of users in the digital world)3 and pre-emption (rather than regulation) 
of individual and collective behaviours and trajectories appears providential to cope with the 
complexities of a world of massive flows of persons, objects and information, and to 
compensate for the difficulties of governing by the law in a complex, globalized world. The 
implicit belief accompanying the growth of ‘big data’ is that, provided one has access to 
massive amounts of raw data (and the world is actually submersed by astronomical amounts 
of digital data), one might become able to anticipate most phenomena (including human 
behaviours) of the physical and the digital worlds, thanks to relatively simple algorithms 
allowing, on a purely inductive statistic basis, to build models of behaviours or patterns, 
without having to consider either causes or intentions. I will call ‘data behaviourism’ this new 
way of producing knowledge about future preferences attitudes, behaviours or events without 
considering the subject’s psychological motivations, speeches or narratives, but rather relying 
on data. The ‘real time operationality’ of devices functioning on such algorithmic logic spares 
human actors the burden and responsibility to transcribe, interpret and evaluate the events of 
world. It spares them the meaning-making processes of transcription or representation, 
institutionalization, convention and symbolization.  
The question whether the pre-emptive powers of algorithms are over-estimated, whether 
algorithms produce ‘valid’ predictions or not, or, in other words, whether ‘it works or not’ is 
not really crucial for what I am interested in here, which is to say that, never mind the validity 
of all this, what counts most is to identify the extent to which relying on the apparent 
operationality of algorithms spares us a series of individual and collective perceptual, 
cognitive, evaluative, conventional, institutional, linguistic efforts or tasks, and, at what price.  
The impacts of the computational turn on governmentality are far from trivial. The constant 
‘adaptation’ of environments to individual and collective ‘profiles’ produced by ‘data 
intelligence’ – be it called ‘personalization’ or ‘technology of security’ – is an unprecedented 
mode of government.4 The type of knowledge it consumes and produces, the modalities 
through which it impacts on individual and collective behaviours, the modes of individuation 
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which may sway or resist algorithmic governmentality5  deserve careful examination. The aim 
of this chapter is precisely to inaugurate such inquiry.  
This chapter is thus about a vertiginous matter. Formulated as an inquiry about the state of 
knowledge, power and subjects after the computational turn, it turns out as a reformulation of 
the question of the possibility of critique, recalcitrance and subjectivation6 in an epistemic and 
political universe gradually deserted by empirical experiment and deductive, causal logic, and 
with regard to a mode of government appearing to disregard the reflexive and discursive 
capabilities (as well as their ‘moral capabilities’) of human agents, in favour of 
computational, pre-emptive, context- and behaviour-sensitive management of risks and 
opportunities. In other words, I wonder whether it is still possible to practice critical thinking 
after a computational turn which, despite its pretences to ‘objectivity’, appears as a turning 
away from the ambitions of modern rationality anchored in empirical experiment and 
deductive – causal- logic, and, despite its promises of personalization and better taking into 
consideration of individual merits, needs, abilities, preferences, does not address individuals 
through their reflexive capabilities, nor through their inscription within collective structures, 
but merely through their ‘profiles’. 
It will then be argued that what makes critique so difficult to practice vis-à-vis the 
computational turn we are now experiencing with the gradual and almost viral generalization 
of data-mining and profiling, is,  
- first, the fact that it produces a zone where (constructed) reality and (background of) the 
world in all its spontaneity and uncertainty become indistinct; 
- second, the fact that the transversal dimension – essential in the scientific, the judicial and 
even the existential domains - of ‘test’, ‘trial’, examination’, ‘assessment’ or ‘epreuve’, or 
even ‘experience’, is rendered obsolete by real time, pre-emptive production of algorithmic 
reality; 
- third, the fact that algorithmic governmentality does not allow for subjectivation processes, 
and thus for recalcitrance, but rather bypasses and avoids any encounter with human reflexive 
subjects. Algorithmic governmentality is without subject: it operates with infra-individual 
data and supra-individual patterns without, at any moment, calling the subject to account for 
himself. 
The chapter will thus present a defence of all these things which usually appear as the 
weaknesses of regulation by the law and adjudication by the judicial system – that is, of the 
legal construction of reality – compared to regulation by the algorithms: ineffectivity, 
inefficiency, belatedness etc. which are all ‘creating’ temporal space and (judicial) scene 
where meaning regains autonomy vis-à-vis the pure factuality of ‘data-behaviourism’, where 
norms can be negotiated and contested, where (legal) subjects can materialize, building their 
motivations and, calling each other into account through language, create occasions for 
individual and collective individuations which are always deviations from known patterns and 
profiles.  
 
The algorithmic production of ‘reality’: data-behaviourism 
Discovering a reality immanent to the data world 
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Each epoch has its own privileged ways to build evidence and to render the world meaningful. 
As Pierre Legendre explains, the world is not given to man. Man can accesses the world only 
through the mediation of language, and thus re-presentation (Legendre, 2001:17). On the 
basis of what is present and available to human senses, representation attests to the presence 
of what is not immediately available to our senses: the (hidden) causes of phenomena, the 
psychological motivations of actions, their potential to develop into or give birth to other 
phenomena or actions,… Boltanski (2009:93-94) states in this respect an interesting 
distinction between ‘reality’ (the result of re-presentation), and ‘the world’: 
The question of the relationship between, on one side, that which appears to hold firm, to be 
consistent, and, on the other side, that which is fraught with uncertainty and opens the way to 
critique, can not be fully deployed if one situates oneself on the sole ground of reality. Indeed, in a 
two dimensional coordinate space, reality tends to be confused with what appears to stand in some 
way by its own strength, that is to say, with the order, and nothing then, allows to understand the 
challenges against this order, at least in its most radical forms (…) But talking of reality in these 
terms amounts to relativize its scope and thereby to suggest that it is detached from a distinct 
background that it does not exhaust. We will call this background the world, considered, to 
paraphrase Wittgenstein, as ‘whatever happens’. One may, in order to render this distinction between 
the ‘reality’ and the ‘world’ palpable, make an analogy with the way in which one can distinguish 
between risk and uncertainty. The risk, in so far as it is probabilizable, constitutes, precisely, one of 
the instruments invented in the XVIIIth century to construct reality. (…) But all events are not 
controllable in the risk logic, so that an unknown portion of radical uncertainty remains. And, just as 
one can make the project of knowing and representing reality, the aim of describing the world, in 
what would be its totality, is not within the reach of anyone. Yet, something of the world manifests 
itself precisely each time events or experiences whose possibility (…) or probability had not been 
inserted in the design of reality, arise in speech and/or surface in the field of individual or collective 
action. 
The distance between ‘the world’ and ‘reality’, this ‘unknown part of radical uncertainty’ has 
always been a challenge for institutions and, at the same times, a precondition for the 
possibility of critique if, by critique we mean, like Foucault (1990): the virtue consisting in 
challenging the very categories through which one is predisposed to perceive and evaluate 
people and situations of the world, rather than merely judging them according to these very 
categories. Critique is:  
a practice that suspends judgment and an opportunity to practice new values, precisely on the basis of 
that suspension. In this perspective, critique targets the construction of a field of occlusive categories 
themselves rather than on the subsumption of a particular case under a pre-constituted category. 
Datamining and profiling, building on the factual availability of enormous amounts of raw 
digital data, instaurate a new ‘truth regime’ - which I call ‘data-behaviourism’ -  creating the 
widest possible zone of indistinction between reality and the world, and eroding the ‘unknown 
part of radical uncertainty,’ thereby also reducing the scope of critique. The result of the 
resented need to automate the processes going from raw data to knowledge, results in the 
discovery of what ‘counts as real’ within the exponentially growing data-warehouses taken as 
the digital version of the world; it is a ‘pure factuality’ of the generated profiles, according to 
a process diagnosed by Alain Supiot (2010: 81) as the  
metamorphosis of all singular quality into measurable quantity whereby we are bound in to a 
speculative loop in which the belief in these numerical images replaces the contact with the reality 
that these images are meant to represent.  
As already suggested, profiles appear – to the general public at least - as a ‘spontaneous’ 
germination 7  from the digital transcription and statistical analysis of ‘reality’ (through 
predictive data mining), resisting characterization as either spontaneous or artefactual and 
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bypassing human interpretation.8 The use of data mining and profiling is usually justified by 
arguments of rationalization. ‘Crunching numbers’ appears as a victory of rational thought 
over emotionally, politically, racially biased human perception.9 With the computational turn, 
our relation to knowledge seems indeed to be changing. In ‘Managing Information’, a special 
report published by The Economist on February 25th 2010, one reads that  
epistemologically speaking, information is made up of a collection of data and knowledge is made up 
of different strands of information. But this special report uses ‘data’ and ‘information’ 
interchangeably because, as it will argue, the two are increasingly difficult to tell apart. Given enough 
raw data, today’s algorithms and powerful computers can reveal new insights that would previously 
have remained hidden. (Cukier: 2010) 
Data, information, knowledge are thus more or less taken to be the same things. Such 
‘knowledge’ thus does not appear as a ‘production of the mind’, with all the artificiality and 
cognitive and emotional biases unavoidably connoting mental productions, but as always 
already ‘given’, immanent to the (digitally recorded) world, in which it is merely 
automatically ‘discovered’, or from which it literally flourishes thanks to algorithmic 
operations rendering invisible correlations operational.  
To what category of sign or signal do the raw ‘big data’ forming the texture of algorithmic 
rationality belong? What is their relation with the ‘things of the world’ of which they are 
taken to be a ‘sign’ or ‘signal’ of? Raw data do not resemble, nor keep even indirect physical 
bound with any thing of the world,10 and they are not conventional symbols thereof either. It 
is, nevertheless, these massive amounts of raw data, this huge, constantly evolving, 
impersonal statistical data which today constitutes ‘the world’ in which algorithms ‘unveil’ 
what algorithmic governmentality takes for ‘the reality’. ‘Reality’ - that knowledge appearing 
to hold, doesn’t seem produced anymore, but always already there, immanent to the 
databases, waiting to be discovered by statistical algorithmic processes. Knowledge is not 
produced about the world anymore, but from the digital world. A kind of knowledge that is 
not tested-by nor testing the world it describes and emanates from: algorithmic reality is 
formed inside the digital reality without any direct contact with the world it is aimed at 
representing. Rather than the validity of its predictive models,11 it is its operationality, its 
plasticity, its contribution to the ‘fluidification’ of economic and social life (and thus of 
capitalism), its efficiency in sparing human agents time and efforts in the interpretation and 
evaluation of persons and events of the world that characterize the ‘intelligence’ of ‘big data’. 
Raw data function as de-territorialized signals,12 inducing reflex responses in computer 
systems, rather than as signs carrying meanings and requiring interpretation. Everything goes 
as if meaning-making was not necessary anymore,13 as if the world was already, absent any 
interpretation, saturated with meaning.14  
‘We wouldn’t speak not because all would have been said, but would have been predicted, always 
already written, edicted, edited, but in a writing that would be the writing of things themselves. Not 
the signature of things, but rather the signs-things, and signosis, this disease of the nailed, fixed say, 
never removed from its eternity, stuck in a topos.’ (Neyrat: 2011) 
 
Atopy of algorithmic reality 
That immanent knowledge is also atopic, in the sense that it is not linked anymore to any 
temporal or geographical anchor. Blossoming from the eternal actuality of data-warehouses, 
fed by data recorded from heterogeneous contexts, the productions of data-behaviourism are 
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at odds with the idea of ‘interested’ knowledge (Spinoza), or of knowledge as enactment and 
result of power relations (Foucault). Patterns discovered in data-warehouses have an aura of 
‘pure’ knowledge, autonomous vis-à-vis both powers and affects. Refining itself in real time, 
building and re-building itself from within the huge ‘numerical memories’ where every bit, 
never mind when and where recorded and stored, floats on the flat surface of pure actuality 
and pure presence,15 the statistical body seems to have expurgated every bit of obscurity: 
everything being always available, it perfectly fits an esthetics of full light and intemporal or 
a-chronological transparency. Therefore, the ‘information’ from which the new knowledge is 
produced will not be evaluated on the basis of traditional criteria of authenticity, historical 
coherence, or critical apperception, but merely on the merits of immediate operationality, 
plasticity, flexible adaptation to changing circumstances, and immediate availability.  
This atopy sheds some doubts about the possibility of speaking of knowledge at all in this 
case if knowing, as Didi-Huberman, (2009:11) argues, requires ‘taking position’, that is,  
situating oneself two times at least, on the two fronts at least that each position comprises as any 
position is, necessarily, relative. It goes, for example with affronting something, but, in front of that 
thing, one must also take into account everything one leaves aside, the off-frame that exists behind 
us, that one may refuse but which, for a substantial part, affects our movement itself, thus our 
position. It also implies to situate oneself over time. Taking position, it is desiring, requesting 
something, it is situating oneself in the present and aiming at a future.16  
!
A distinct usage of statistics 
Data behaviourism is different from statistical quantification  
‘Data behaviourism’ is very different from other ‘governmental’ strategies based on statistics, 
and which, most of the time, are systems of quantification, rendering heterogeneous situations 
and accomplishments commensurable. As explained by Desrosières (2010) benchmarking 
also contributes to reduce or manage uncertainty, but is aimed at building and negotiating 
spaces of commensurability by reaching agreements about measurement procedures and 
allowing for an arbitration of means and finalities. ‘Benchmarking’ translates otherwise 
incommensurable objects or situations into numbers. Such mechanism of quantification 
solves a series of difficulties of evaluation (of human actions and productions). Quantification 
is a manner to build objects with an (ideally) negotiated, conventional value. The 
quantification process binds individuals together within a given system of evaluation and 
constrains them to use the ‘language’ of quantification in comparing their respective merits, 
needs, etc. This makes of benchmarking a strategy perfectly articulated with the ideal of ‘due 
process’.  
Quantification logics create epistemic communities and enable human evaluation processes, 
whereas algorithmic reason simply exempts from the burden of creating any type of 
community, of organizing interpretation or evaluation processes. The algorithmic rationality 
governing data-mining and profiling processes and the logic of ‘data-behaviourism’ carried 
thereby is simply at odds with the idea of (due) process or even, simply, with the idea of 
appearance (in laboratory, in judicial court,…) of actual persons, situations, or objects. As 
will be developed further later on, algorithmic governmentality carefully avoids all types of 
confrontations, especially with those who are affected by its governmental effects. ‘Data-
behaviourism’ spares the burden of testing, questioning, examining, evaluating actual facts 
and persons of flesh and blood, it avoids to make objects or persons appear in laboratories or 
in court in order to test or question their causes or intentions.  
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Data-behaviourism does not presuppose nor tests hypotheses about the world 
Unlike other uses of statistics – like uses in epidemiology – datamining does not presuppose 
nor reinforces or invalidates any hypothesis about the world17 but merely appears as an 
agnostic, pragmatic, highly operational and effective manner to structure, in an anticipative 
way, the possible field of actions of ‘bodies’. This agnosticism contributes in making it appear 
both an inoffensive and a universally valid way of rendering the world meaningful. In 
particular, the ‘dropping’ of causality does not revive the deterministic metaphysics 
accompanying early uses of statistics, despite possible misinterpretations of the idea that in a 
data-rich environment such as ours, ‘anything can be predicted’ by ‘crunching numbers’ 
(Ayres: 2007). The computational turn is in no way a return to the deterministic metaphysics 
accompanying the advent of statistics in the nineteenth century and exhibited for example in 
the writings of Laplace (1814) - defending the idea that human actions, even those who seem 
to result from chance or human liberty, are in fact governed by laws as necessary as the laws 
governing phenomena in physics - or Quetelet (1835) - who constructed the idea of ‘the 
average man’. On the contrary, it is precisely because determinist thought does not appear 
plausible at all any more, and because human psychological motivations and singularities 
appear – maybe more than ever - incommensurable and unpredictable due to the 
complexification and massification of flows of persons, data and objects that algorithmic 
systems of statistical profiling appear so appealing today, relieving human beings from the 
harsh tasks of interpreting and evaluating facts in an epistemic universe devoid of common 
testing and evaluation criteria.   
 
The rate of intentionality, causality, experience and discourse have dropped 
Betraying the ambitions of modern, deductive, rationality linking observable phenomena (that 
is, phenomena pre-selected as objects of observation and assessment in view of explicit and 
determined interests) to their causes, the ‘algorithmic rationality’ follows an inductive logic. 
Indifferent to the causes of phenomena, ‘data behaviourism’ is anchored in the purely 
statistical observation of correlations (independent from any kind of logic) among data 
collected in a variety of heterogeneous contexts. This does not mean, of course, that the 
computational turn has a direct impact on the empirical (in)existence of causal interactions 
between phenomena or on the nature and degree of intentionality or rationality of human 
actions.18 I merely suggest, parallel to what Benjamin (2000:115) noticed with regard to 
experience:  
It is as if we had been deprived of a faculty of ours which seemed unalienable, the most ensured of 
all: the faculty to exchange experiences. One of the reasons of this phenomenon is obvious: the rate 
of experience has dropped. And it continues to fall indefinitely.19 
Now, the rates of causality and intentionality – by ‘rate’ I mean our ability or willingness to 
use these categories to predict, regulate, and give account of phenomena - have dropped as 
well. Sometimes, ‘resources of meaning’ become unavailable. Walter Benjamin, back in 
1933, identified the incapacity to transmit an experience, and thus the ‘weakness of 
experience’ as a consequence of the world war (survivors of battle fields came back mute, not 
enriched with experience they could share, but impoverished by the ‘irrepresentable’). The 
functioning of experience as resource for the production of meaning may also be impaired in 
situations where the ‘truth value’ attributed to experience or experiment decreases. Georgio 
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Agamben, for example, articulates the dropping of the rate of experience with the decline of 
the ‘authority to speak’:  
Because experience finds its necessary correlate less in knowledge than in authority, that is, in speech 
and narrative, today no one seems to have enough authority to guarantee an experience; should one 
have it, one would not be touched by the idea of establishing an experience on the ground of that 
authority. That which characterizes present time is on the contrary that all authority is grounded on 
what cannot be experienced; to an authority that would be legitimated merely by an experience, no 
one would grant any credit. (Agamben, 2002: 26)20  
In the context of data-mining and profiling, the same thing happens: patterns and profiles are 
not merely competing with testimony, expertise, discourses of authority or confession, they 
make linguistic modalities of ‘evidence’ appear obsolete compared to the operationality, 
immediacy and objectivity of data-behaviourism. If, thus, the computational turn does not 
have any impact on the phenomena of causality and human agency and the reflexive 
capabilities it presupposes, and leaves them untouched, it nevertheless deflects concerns or 
attentions away from these previously privileged perspectives of causality and intentional 
agency or individual and collective ‘authority’ (that is, for our purpose, the capability to 
‘author’ one’s actions, to have the ‘authority’ to give account of one’s actions meanings).  
 
The obsolescence of tests and challenges 
The ‘algorithmic reason’, immanent to the digitally recorded ‘real’, escapes the types of trials, 
tests, examinations, experiments, and other épreuves or challenges which usually appear 
essential to attest to the robustness, truth, validity or legitimacy of claims and hypothesis 
formulated about reality in the scientific, the judicial and even the existential domains 
(Ronell: 2005). Data-behaviourism simply appears to have rendered the interpretive time and 
space of trial or process irrelevant. It is a regime of truth evaluated against criteria of cost-
effectiveness and operationality. The computational turn thus attests to the decline of 
interpretation to the benefit of something much more immediate (and immediacy is one of the 
connotations usually attached to efficiency), which is statistical inference operated on the 
basis of correlations, while validation of patterns or profiles happen through a kind of  
‘backward performativity’: anything that would happen and be recorded, never mind whether 
it fits a pre-existing pattern or profile or not, will contribute to the refinement and 
improvement of the ‘statistical body’, and ‘validate’21 the methods of automatic interpretation 
or correlation to which they are subjected. This does not mean that systems are not checked at 
all, that they are not monitored as to ensure that they perform in function of what they are 
supposed to achieve: it is just that these kinds of checks and tests are confined to check the 
system’s operationality. The operationality, real-time character, plasticity of the ‘algorithmic 
reason’ are at odd with the interruption, the distance, the delays which are the pre-conditions 
for a critical appraisal of any kind of produced knowledge. If ‘predictive data mining’ does 
not re-present reality, its ‘real time’ operationality, the fact that decisions are increasingly 
taken on the basis of profiles, the relative performativity of these profiles, leads, de facto, to a 
situation of quasi-indistinction between algorithmically produced ‘reality’, and the ‘world’ 
from which it is supposed to emanate from, whereas the distinction, the non-coïncidence of 
things and their re-presentations are necessary to leave open the space of critique.  
This truth regime is often praised for its ‘objectivity’ not for the reason that it would have 
been ‘robust’ enough to pass the usual tests of scientific validity or political legitimacy. On 
the contrary, the ‘force’ of the knowledge produced by algorithms is proportional to the 
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difficulty to submit it to any convention of quantification, or to any kind of test. The ‘force’ of 
algorithmic governmentality is thus proportional to its ‘non-robustness’ (if one takes 
robustness to be the capacity to sustain challenges and critiques). This ‘non-robustness’ is also 
what makes the esthetics of algorithmic governmentality: an esthetic of fluidity, continuity, 
real time adaptation, immediacy, dynamism, plasticity, non-obtrusiveness, seamlessness… 
Compared to such a powerful esthetics, human interpretation and subjective accounts of 
reality appear rather inesthetic (time-consuming, always belated, perhaps more authentic but 
less trustworthy, perhaps more critical but less operational, etc.).  
 
Algorithmic governmentality 
The spread of ‘data behaviourism’ accompanying the deployment of data-mining and 
profiling systems in a diversity of applications inaugurates an unprecedented regime of power 
which I have previously called  ‘algorithmic governmentality’.  
 
Algorithmic government is spectral 
The focus on anticipation and pre-emption shifts the target of ‘power’ from actuality, and 
from the present wilderness of facts, to potentiality, to the risks and opportunities (which are 
the virtual dimension of what is here and now, that is, the portion of irreducible uncertainty 
that one has renounced trying to render commensurable22), the future which it tries to tame 
through anticipative framing of informational and physical contexts. ‘Data-behaviourism’ is 
thus an anticipative coincidence with a ‘real’ which it is aimed at preventing and which, if the 
system works properly, will thus never happen23 (this is the case when data-mining and 
profiling is are used in security scenarios) or with a ‘real’ with which it will entertain relations 
of backwards performativity (or feedback loop performativity). The ‘probabilistic subject’ is 
not the same as the actual, experiential, present and sentient subject.  
The algorithmic government thus contrasts with what we know about a neoliberal mode of 
government which produces the subjects it needs. Through the ubiquitous injunction – and its 
internalization by subjects - of maximization of performance (production) and enjoyment 
(consumption), neoliberalism produces ‘hyper-subjects’ having, as their normative horizon, 
the continuously reiterated project of ‘becoming themselves’, and passionately engaged in 
‘self-control’, ‘self-entrepreneurship’, ‘self-evaluation’.24 Algorithmic governmentality does 
not produce any kind of subject. It affects, without addressing them, people in all situations of 
possible criminality, fraud, deception, consumption,…which are situations where they are not 
requested to ‘produce’ anything, and certainly not subjectivation. Rather, algorithmic 
governmentality bypasses consciousness and reflexivity, and operates on the mode of alerts 
and reflexes.  
 
Unlike government by the law, algorithmic government affects potentialities rather 
than actual persons and behaviours 
Classically, ‘governing’, that is, producing a certain ‘regularity’ of behaviours (among 
citizens, customers, patients, students, employees etc.) consists – at least in liberal countries – 
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in inducing individuals to choose, in the range of things they may do or may abstain from 
doing, those things which best fit the interests of the community. In Nomography, or the Art 
of Inditing Laws, Bentham (1934) explains the process through which compliance with the 
Laws is produced:  
(…) to be productive of any of the effects intended by it, the law of the legislator requires an 
appendage, which, for the production of its effects, is never needed by the head of a private family. 
With reference to the law just mentioned, this appendage may be styled the subsidiary law: of this 
subsidiary law, the business and object consist in the presenting to the party or parties subject, 
inducement directed to the purpose of producing on their parts compliance with the principal law. 
And here, then, we have existing on each occasion, in necessary connexion with one another, two 
distinct species of law; namely, 1. The principal, or say the direction-giving; 2. The subsidiary, or say 
the inducement-giving law. 
These distinct species of laws are addressed to two different classes of persons:—the direction-giving 
law is addressed to the person or persons at whose hands compliance is constantly looked for in the 
first instance;—addressed always to a person, or set of persons other than the above, is the subsidiary, 
or say inducement-giving law. 
This person, or set of persons, is different, according as the inducement employed by the lawgiver is 
of the nature of evil or of the nature of good. 
If it be of the nature of evil, the inducement is styled punishment; and the sort of person to whom this 
subsidiary law is addressed is the judge: and the act which he is calculated to perform, in the event of 
non-compliance with the will expressed by the principal law, is an act of punishment—an act to 
which exercise is given by producing evil, or say pain, on the part of him by whom compliance with 
the will expressed by the principal law has failed to be made. 
Such inducements/disincentives do not affect in any way the potentialities (or puissance 
d’agir) of individuals, of the persons to which the first type of laws is addressed.25 Describing 
the ‘potentialities of the legal subject’ - that is, to describe the field of immune possibilities, of 
what remains immune from attunements by the Law - would require a multi-level analysis. It 
should, on the one hand, describe how the operations of the law impact on individual 
conducts. Legal commandments deserve much more careful attention than the attention I can 
devote to the topic in the present chapter. Beyond the blunt statement that legal constraints are 
not the same as physical constraints or pre-conscious constraints – leaving individuals the 
ultimate choice to obey or disobey the law, be it at their own risks, distinctions exist in the 
Law between ‘rights to’ and ‘rights not to’. That the (presumed) calculating selves obey the 
law because, after rational deliberation, they believe that the disadvantages ensuing from the 
risk of being punished for disobedience if caught outweighs the gains or advantages he may 
expect from disobeying26 does not by itself impact (increase or decrease) the individual 
faculty to comply or not to comply with the law. In the liberal legal system, the integration of 
the norm by the subjects presupposes and relies on their reflexive capabilities and their 
capacities to balance the expected pleasures and pains ensuing from either compliance with or 
violations of the Laws. But choosing compliance does not affect their (theoretical and 
practical) faculty to breach the Law. This ‘potentiality’, which is, according to Georgio 
Agamben, a ‘faculty’, something which does not need being actualized in order to exist but 
which does not disappear either in case of actualization,27 may well be a crucial element to 
‘define’ what subjectivity is about, in a perspective taking into account the inheritance of 
critical scholarship of the sixties and seventies. From then on, the ‘subject’ is not any more 
defined by his/her possibility of self-positioning, but by his/her capability to continuously and 
interactively discover a ‘reality’ in appropriate ways, a capability to be present in that reality, 
that is, to open and expose him/herself in it while maintaining him/herself as ‘self’, that is, as 
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project to be and become him/herself (Haber, 2007: 213). This is what the ‘virtuality’ of the 
subject is about, and one sees that virtuality is indeed paradoxically definitional of the 
subject.28  
In situations where there is a (private or public) need or wish of ‘government’,29 the ‘success’ 
of ‘algorithmic reason’ is proportional to its ability to help public and private bureaucracies 
anticipating what bodies and persons could do30 by allowing them to perceive  (rather than to 
understand) that which is not (yet) perceptible to ordinary senses without having either to test, 
experiment, interrogate material (human or non-human) bodies31 nor to rely on testimonies, 
confessions, expertise or other discourse of authority. The computational turn renders persons 
and situations immediately and operationally ‘meaningful’ through their automatic 
subsumption into (future opportunities or risk) patterns or profiles, without the interpretative 
detour of trial or process and even without concrete, material confrontation or encounter with 
the actual objects or persons concerned. These unprecedented algorithmic statistical practices 
combine with the contemporary dominance of new regulative principles (often inspired by a 
new set of fears of imminent ‘catastrophes’) such as precaution and risk minimization, 
privileging detection, classification, anticipative evaluation and prevention or pre-emption of 
what bodies could do, over topical efforts to remedy the causes of sub-optimal actual, present 
situations.32 Unlike government by the law, the ‘force’ of algorithmic government consists in 
separating subjects from their ability to do or to not do certain things. Its target – as its focus 
on prediction and pre-emption attests – is contingency as such, the conditional mode of the 
formula ‘what a body could do’, 33 whereas this conditional mode is definitional of  agency as 
such: 
But what problems, what way of being, feeling and acting does the word agency sum up or signal? In 
what way could it help us? It could help us in suspending the metaphysical and scholastic opposition 
between liberty and necessity, in departing from the opposition between sociologies of determinism 
and philosophies of ‘miracle’, ‘act’ or ‘event’. It could help us to refuse to perceive liberty as the 
other of power or domination. To not presuppose that liberty has its source in an absolutely sovereign 
subject. To think of liberty as production and as relation, and, indissociably, to think of liberty as 
productivity: as practical capability to be affected and produce effects. To orient thought towards an 
empirical, pragmatic approach of the question of emancipation: an art of agency. (Vidal, 2008: 17-
23).34 
Algorithmic governmentality thus exhibits a new strategy of uncertainty management 
consisting in minimizing the uncertainty associated to human agency: the capacity humans 
have to do or not to do all they are physically capable of. Effected through the reconfiguration 
of informational and physical architectures and/or environments within which certain things 
become impossible or unthinkable, and throwing alerts or stimuli producing reflex responses 
rather than interpretation and reflection, it affects individuals in their agency that is, in their 
inactual, virtual dimension of potentiality and spontaneity (which legal inducements and 
dissuasions leave untouched), including with regard to potential disobedience.  
Applications such as dynamic biometrics, intelligent video-surveillance, individualized 
recommendations systems, smart environments, ambient intelligence, and autonomic 
computing appear, primarily, as solutions to an epistemic governmental problem: the radical 
indeterminacy and incommensurability of contexts and behaviours. Yet, these new kinds of 
statistical treatment of raw data, not less than ‘classical’ statistics (Dosrosières, 2008), are at 
the same time ‘cognitive interfaces’ productive of specific kinds of ‘operational knowledge’ 
(in the case of data-mining and profiling, probabilistic knowledge about intentions, 
propensities, preferences, risks and opportunities carried either by individuals or situations) 
and instruments of ‘governmental’ channelling (rather than regulating or coordinating) social 
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activities and of  guiding public interventions. This ‘computational turn’ upsets traditional 
modalities of political, legal and social production and enforcement of norms. As such, the 
resulting norms (patterns or profiles) elude usual tests both of epistemic validity and of 
political legitimacy, despite having, when embedded in systems of detection, classification 
and anticipative evaluation of human behaviours, governmental effects in the various spheres 
where they apply. This ‘algorithmic governmentality’, and its self-enforcing, implicit, 
statistically established norms emanating, in real time, from digitalized reality, contrasts with 
‘political governmentality’, and the imperfectly enforced, explicit, deliberated, character of 
laws resulting from time consuming political deliberation. Therefore, depending on the 
context and circumstances, the adjunction or substitution of algorithmic governmentality to 
political governmentality may be felt as a welcome, cost-effective objectivation and 
automatization of normative production and enforcement, or as a dangerous evolution towards 
further depolitization of normative production and as a threatening erosion of the protective 
and recursive role of the judicial process. 
 
Subject matter(s): potency 
Algorithmic governmentality avoids all kinds of confrontation with human subjects.  
The pre-emptive character of algorithmic governmentality, the fact that it operates often at a 
pre-conscious stage (framing conducts by ‘throwing alerts’ – and nothing is less intentional  
(in the sense of conscious direction of attention) than being ‘alerted’ or having one’s attention 
attracted by something) following the automatic and anticipative evaluation of what bodies 
could do (potentialities) rather than of what people are actually doing, the fact that profiling 
spares the burden of making persons appear as agents, leave no occasion for persons to 
become ‘subjects’ of algorithmic governmentality. Algorithmic governmentality does not 
allow for the process of subjectivation to happen, because it does not confront ‘subjects’ as 
moral agents (avoiding to question them about their preferences and intentions, about the 
reasons and motivations of their actions) but attunes their future informational and physical 
environment according to the predictions contained in the statistical body. The only ‘subject’ 
algorithmic governmentality needs is a unique, supra-individual, constantly reconfigurated 
‘statistical body’ made of the infra-individual digital traces of impersonal, disparate, 
heterogeneous, dividualized facets of daily life and interactions. This infra- and supra-
individual statistical body carries a kind of ‘memory of the future’ whereas the strategy of 
algorithmic governmentality consists in either ensuring or preventing its actualization. 
Algorithmic governmentality does not need to tame the wilderness of facts and behaviours, 
nor does it aim at producing docile subjects. One may even say – against part of the 
surveillance studies community – that algorithmic governmentality decreases the risks of 
anticipative conformity of behaviours or the chilling effects associated with ubiquitous 
surveillance. This is because, unlike ‘visible’, ‘scopic’ surveillance generating ‘norms’ which 
remain, broadly, intelligible to individuals, and available for them to compare and attune their 
behaviours, algorithmic governmentality carefully avoids any direct confrontation with and 
impact on flesh and blood persons. One may even say that algorithmic governmentality 
simply ignores the embodied individuals it affects and has as sole ‘subject‘, a ‘statistical 
body’, that is, a constantly evolving ‘data-body’ or network of localizations in actuarial tables. 
In such a governmental context, the subjective singularities of individuals, their personal 
psychological motivations or intentions do not matter. What matters is the possibility to link 
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any trivial information or data left behind or voluntarily disclosed by individuals with other 
data gathered in heterogeneous contexts and establish statistically meaningful correlations. 
The process bypasses individual consciousness and rationality (not only because operations of 
data-mining are invisible, but also because its results are unintelligible for the instruments of 
modern rationality), and produces their ‘effects of government’ by anticipatively ‘adapting’ 
the informational and physical environment of persons according to what these persons are 
susceptible to do or wish, not by adapting persons to the norms which are dominant in a given 
environment.  
 
Beyond the legal subject as functional fiction, rethinking the subject’s potency 
I don’t intend to rehabilitate the autonomous, unitary, perfectly intentional and rational 
subject, the fundamental unit of liberalism. As for the ‘subject’, or the ‘person’, I hypothesize 
that there has never been anything to be nostalgic about. The rational, liberal, individual 
subject, or the autonomous legal subject have never been anything else than useful or even 
necessary functional fictions without empirical, phenomenal correlates, despite their merits 
and the fact that, in a series of domains, they need to be presupposed. However, the legal 
subject must be presupposed by the law, even though this subject is in no way an empirical 
entity. This is powerfully explained by Cléro (2007: 76): 
One may, for example, challenge the existence of the I, of me, challenge the characteristics one 
spontaneously or traditionally attach to I or me, that of being a substance, of being one, of existing 
individually and as a person, one may also refute the paralogisms which pretend to demonstrate its 
characters. And yet, one may use the fiction of the me in order to orient moral behaviours, finalize 
legal conducts, organize value systems. The person, challenged at the ontological level, is 
rehabilitated at the deontological level: is it reasonable? But, also: do we have the possibility to do 
otherwise ? Could we, suddenly, reorganize our Law, our ethics, without the help of the notion of 
person, notwithstanding the weakness of its ontological value? Unable to operate such a change, I 
envision my life as the realization of my person, the life of others as worth promoting on the same 
ground or, at least, worthy of the same respect. Let’s say that the notion of person is a fiction. 
I thus happily endorse the anti-humanistic posture of Althusser (subjects are constituted 
through ideological interpellation, and do not pre-exist such interpellations) Butler (subjects 
constitute themselves by ‘giving account of themselves’, and it is this ‘gesture’ of ‘giving 
account’, not the ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of what they are telling, that constitutes the subjects), or –
Derrida (1990) 35 according to whom the law presupposes and constructs the legal subject (one 
appears before the law with our will and imagination, but without the law we would not be 
subjects)or, more generally, in the only possible perspective taking into account the 
inheritance of the sixties and seventies’ critique : 
From now on, what we have to deal with is a subject defined not by the possibility of self-positing, 
but the continuous ability to interactively discover a reality, in ad hoc ways, and to be present in it 
while rendering this real present, or, said otherwise, to open and expose oneself in it while 
maintaining oneself as ‘self’, that is, as a project of being and becoming oneself. (Haber, 2007: 213)  
These ‘pragmatic’ accounts understand the ‘self’ as a process rather than a phenomenon, a 
process happening between individuals, in a space that both presupposes and constitutes ‘the 
common’.36 The self – as processes of subjectivation and individuation - is an interstitial 
matter, and a contribution to the continuous, never achieved ‘effort of individual and 
collective recomposition of the lost totality’ - never mind the symbolic nature of such totality 
(Bourriaud:1994).  
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Understanding that the target of algorithmic governmentality is the inactual, potential  
dimensions of human existence, its dimentions of virtuality, the conditional mode of what 
people ‘could’ do, their potency or agency, allows us to understand what is at stake here: a 
deprivation which does not have as its opposite, the possession of oneself.37  
What we care about is certainly not a mythical transparency of the subject to himself, its 
pretended pre-existence, as a fixed entity, but rather the continuous processes through which 
subjectivation and individuation occur and thus the virtual and utopian dimensions of human 
ex-istence.38 Walter Benjamin described utopia as an excessive anticipation, or an anticipation 
always in excess, like the gesture of a child learning how to take things by throwing his hand 
towards the moon (Adensour, 2010: 99). These sorts of gestures in excess are designs. They 
give shape to our projects. They draw motives. By these gestures, we also take ‘position’ that 
is, we situate ourselves, despite the atopy of algorighmic governmentality, we take 
consistence (both as physical entities and auto-biographical trajectories) in an ‘outside’ 
opened by our gesture (or enunciation), as carriers of ‘events’ (which are nothing but the 
encounter of (unpredicted) circumstances and meaning making gestures). ‘Motivation’ is the 
drawing of ‘motive’, the singularity of design, beyond truth and falsity. Taking position, 
making such gesture, does not so much require ‘equal information’, privacy or transparency 
enhancing technologies etc. which keep us sealed inside the ‘algorithmic reality’, as it 
requires ‘outer’ spaces and time for heterogeneous modes of creation of reality.  
Transparency enhancing technologies (TETs) and Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) etc. 
pretend to empower individuals and allow for contestation but as they are operating ‘within’ 
algorithmic governmentality, they are disabled, because algorithmic governmentality is a 
mode of governmentality without negativity (no organization of questioning or challenge of 
either cognitive or normative productions). There is just no space nor time for contesting 
(even if one gets to the point where everything becomes transparent to everybody). 
Recalcitrance must come from outside, from ‘consistant’, that is, sentient bodies animated 
with a perceptive life (intensity) whose scope is not confined to the ‘infosphere’.  
 
How do we find an ‘outside’, an excess of the world over reality, a space of recalcitrance 
from which to gain solidity and to practice critique?39 Rather than resurrecting personological 
approaches (epitomized by the possessive individualism of data protection regimes) which 
would be both ill grounded and ineffective, we should realize that the fundamental stake – 
what has to be preserved as a resource antecedent to both the ‘subject’ and sociality, as excess 
of the world over the algorithmic reality, is ‘the common’, this ‘in between’, this space of 
common appearance (comparution) within which we are mutually addressed to each others. 
The mode of address that links us together is essentially linguistic. 40 Language is the 
polyphonic ‘shape’ of our togetherness, of our common projections of ‘becoming’. ‘But how 
could one come back to what has never been?’, Frédéric Neyrat asked in his beautiful book 
about Artaud and the ‘Western spell’.  
‘Here, it is not / drawing / in the proper meaning of the word, of some incorporation / of reality in the 
drawing’,41 it is not about incorporating a reality (the common), that would have been antecedent to 
the drawing, as this reality (of the common) is precisely that which is lacking. (Neyrat, 2009:54)42 
To the extent that subjects have to give account of themselves despite the fact that they may 
not have mastered the circumstances which have made them act in a certain way, the ‘motive’ 
or ‘drawing’ they ‘make’, does not ‘re-present’ the antecedent reality as much as it opens new 
political possibilities at the very location where the limits of re-presentation and 
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representability are exposed: in this interstice between ‘the world’ and ‘reality’, and this is the 
‘outside’ we were looking for (Butler, 2000).  
Here one perceives, at last, that ‘due process’, ‘subjectivation’ and ‘critique’ may well be 
three different names for a same exigency: we speak, precisely, because we are on the edge of 
the abyss, because no subject is antecedent his enunciation, and thus, to rejoin a ‘common’ 
that is crumbling under our words, that is never securely acquired, that happens only as 
unexpected fulguration. The exigency is this one: convening this impersonal form of the 
common through a language which gives us individual and collective consistence – at safe 
distance from both algorithmic profiling and neoliberal injunctions of performance and 
maximization of jouissance. 
How then could we make use of the technologies of the information society so as to re-
enchant the common? By making this re-enchantment of the common their primary goal, 
reconfiguring their design accordingly when needed, by protecting that goal by law, by 
pursuing that goal in our practices. ‘Putting man in the machine’, following Félix Guattari’s 
invitation, could mean just this: producing interstices in which the common may happen – 
even if these interstices should interrupt or grip the fluidity of our techno-capitalist reality, 
thereby really producing crisis, at last, allowing for a recomposition of what, for human 
beings, for the common, appears a humanely consistent reality.  
These consistencies need, in order to happen, heterotopic spatio-temporal spaces interrupting 
digital and capitalistic flows – such as the judicial, theatrical, literary, laboratory scenes. 
These scenes guarantee a certain heterogeneity of the modes of construction of realities 
against the ubiquitous deployment of an operational but ‘neutralizing’ and meaningless 
algorithmic rationality.  
 
Conclusion 
Algorithmic government, failing to acknowledge anything else than infra-individual data and 
supra-individual profiles, and avoiding confrontations with subjects either physically or 
linguistically (testimony, avowal, and other forms of biographical representation are 
becoming useless in the big data era), may be understood as the culmination of a process of 
dissipation of the institutional, spatial, temporal and linguistic conditions of subjectivation for 
the sake of the ‘objective’ and operational pre-emption of potential behaviours. An 
algorithmic government that frames the future, affecting individuals and groups on the mode 
of alert throwing and reflex responses but which never confront them nor exposes itself to be 
challenged by human liberty eradicates the conditions of critique, deprives human beings of 
their fundamental potency, which is their capacity to emerge as individual and collective 
subjects in a ‘common’ which is interstitial between the world and reality. The very 
fundamental differences between government by law and government by algorithms are 
certainly that:  
- the law preserves individual and collective agencies or potencies, whereas the preemptive 
stance of algorithmic government and its affectation of individuals either at a pre-conscious 
stage or by reconfiguration of their environments so that certain courses of action become 
impracticable, does not preserve such agency or potency; 
- because it organises the challenge of its own normative productions (through judicial 
process and legislative processes), the law opens time and spaces (with specific rituals etc.) 
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interrupting the fluidity and real-time metabolism of algorithmic processes, and provides a 
series of scenes where norms can be made visible, intelligible and contestable, where 
individual and collective subjects may become consistent and give shape to the common.  
- Maybe more fundamentally, because it requires people to talk, to make use of language, 
after the facts, to recall, re-present the facts, re-draw the motives of their acts; the law (just as 
theatre, or literature) – especially in the context of judicial process – provides a scene where 
subjects perform their ‘authorship’, with an authority to speak, to give account of themselves. 
Becoming subjects, people thereby re-historicize the time against the total synchronization of 
a digital world space of which all points are all immediately contemporaneous (Fischbach, 
2011: 110-112) in a ‘real time’, depriving people from duration (‘real time’ is not a dimension 
of life, as life is always experienced over time and not as a juxtaposition of successive 
instances of ‘now’). They contribute to a legal construction of reality at odds with the 
algorithmic construction of ‘their’ profiles, as well as with neoliberal productivity and 
enjoyment maximizations injunctions. These privileged (judicial, legislative, theatrical, 
literary,…) scenes are threatened today not by technologies (they could as well be used to re-
enchant the common, facilitate enunciations and emancipation), but by that of which the 
success of algorithmic governmentality is but a symptom ; a mode of government motivated 
almost exclusively by the goal of fluidification (or liquidation) of existences, requiring the 
suppression of all that would oppose the indistinctiveness of the world and a numerical, 
calculable reality. Realizing the magnitude of the phenomenon, and finding, collectively, new 
configurations between human existents, the law and technologies, this would be our tasks for 
the present and for the future, as there is no need of data mining to guess that these tasks are 
not meant to ever be achieved.  
 
Notes 
                                                
* I wish to express all my gratitude to Mireille Hildebrandt for her thoughtful and stimulating comments to this 
chapter, as well as for earlier enlightening conversations.  
1 The term ‘purpose’ may appear counter-intuitive in this context, speaking of data-warehouses which, by 
definition, contain massive amounts of data collected in heterogeneous contexts, for a variety of initial purposes 
which, at the stage of storage in data-warehouses, have become irrelevant. Unlike traditional statistics – which 
were performed in view of confirming or infirming specific hypothesis about the ‘real’, or were performed by 
government officials in order for the State to gain specific and quantified knowledge of its human and material 
resources – the aim of data-mining is much less pre-oriented towards any specific end. 
2 The United States General Accounting Office, defines data-mining as ‘the application of database technology 
and techniques (such as statistical analysis and modelling) to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in 
data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results. As has been widely reported, many federal 
data mining efforts involve the use of personal information that is mined from databases maintained by public as 
well as private sector organizations’.  The objectives of data-mining, according to the same report, include 
‘improving service or performance; detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; analysing scientific and research 
information; managing human resources; detecting criminal activities or patterns; and analysing intelligence and 
detecting terrorist activities.’ (General Accounting Office: 2004) 
3 Farecast, for example, a part of Microsoft’s Bing search engine, advises users about the optimal time to buy 
their airplane tickets, predicting when the prices are the lowest, by examining 225 billion flight and price 
records.   
4 By ‘government’ I mean the practice of framing the fields of actions of others. ‘Government’ in this sense is 
not the monopoly of public authorities. Private actors – internet service providers, operators of search engines 
and social networks, or, more generally, marketeers, employers, insurers, parents, school teachers etc., to the 
extent that they frame the possible field of perceptions and actions of others, govern.  
5 For a detailed description of algorithmic governmentality, see Rouvroy and Berns (2010). 
6 See for example Boltanski and Thévenot (2005) 
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7 Despite the fact that human intervention is of course involved in the initial design, training (in the case of 
learning algorithms) and supervision of algorithms, the nature and extent of this human intervention gradually 
blurred with their growing ‘autonomic’ capabilities of algorithms.  
8 On interpretation as essential role or function of humanities, and on the absolute necessity of thinking of 
interpretation as essential step in the production of knowledge, see Citton (2010). 
9 See for example Zarsky (2011: 327): ‘if data mining is accepted by the legislature, it might only require limited 
judicial review. This is as opposed to the use of profiles and field officer discretion, which calls for greater 
scrutiny.’ 
10 Events of the physical world may leave traces (footsteps imprints in the sand, animals’ or plants’ pheromones 
left behind and acting as messages to the other individuals of the same species, photographic imprint of light on 
the photographic paper,…). These traces may well then be translated into data, but the data themselves are in no 
way traces by themselves. They may re-present traces but are not in themselves an imprint of some event of the 
physical world on a reactive surface. Of course an objection could be raised on the ground that internet users 
‘leave traces’ on the internet but here again, I would suggest that, because, from an algorithmic point-of-view, 
we don’t exist as subjects in this context, but merely as a trans-individual, continuously evolving network of data 
points, the data we release on the internet, as soon as it is decontextualized, anonymized and aggregated with 
data released by others in a multitude of heterogeneous geographic and temporal contexts, are not, individually, 
traces of us, but function as pure ‘signals’ triggering different kinds of aggregations and re-constructions of 
operational meanings.  
11 ‘Crunching numbers’ may well be a ‘new way to be smart’ (Ian Ayres), but as crunching numbers merely 
provides a quantitative account of (potential) reality, the ‘knowledge’ it produces is unavoidably reductionist, 
‘only’ taking into account aspects of the world which can be translated into data-signals, and enrolled in 
algorithmic calculation.  
12 Signals can be calculated quantitatively, independent from their meaning (Eco, 1976:20). See also Genosko 
(2008). 
13 My translation. 
14 Algorithmic governmentality, then, appears as the perfect embodiment of the capitalist world whose texture is 
made of liberated flows of deterritorialized, de-coded, neutralized signals. See Guattari (1977:264). 
15 This may even become truer in the era of cloud computing.  
16 My translation. 
17 ‘Profiling in the European Union: a high-risk practice’, INEX policy brief, N.10, June 2010: ‘while more 
classical statistical approaches aim at validating or invalidating proposed correlations believed to be pertinent 
answers to existing questions, with profiling there are no preliminary questions. The correlations as such become 
the ‘pertinent’ information, triggering questions and suppositions.’ (Gonzalez-Fuster, Gutwirth, Ellyne: 2010)   
18 And one may of course discuss whether causal relations do exist by themselves or are merely attributed by 
men, but this does not really matter for our current discussion, as the existence or inexistence of ‘natural’ causal 
relations is not affected by the computational turn.  
19 My translation. 
20 My translation. 
21 This is not a true ‘validation’ though. True validation presupposes some external point from which the 
evaluation is performed. Here, ‘validation’ is immanent to the system awaiting validation. 
22 Anything that is ‘actual’ is always surrounded by a cloud of virtual images. Pure actuality does not exist. 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1996: 179).  
23 This does not mean that the system will not detect false positives. Yet, the proportion of such false positives 
will be impossible to assess. 
24 See Leblanc (2007). 
25 See Hohfeld (1913).  
26 There are of course many other reasons explaining compliance with the Law, including the coherence between 
the legal content and social norms and expectations, habits, deference to authority etc. 
27 See Agamben (2002). 
28 On the virtual dimention of the subject, and its relation with collective utopia, see Rouvroy (2011a).  
29 By ‘government’ I mean any action, performed by private or public agents, aimed at structuring or framing the 
possible field of actions of others, no matter for which specific purposes, and no matter the success or failure of 
such enterprise. Governing, thus, presupposes a certain amount of knowledge of what others ‘could do’, of what 
would deter them or incite them in behaving in certain ways or choosing certain trajectories rather than others. 
Alternatively, when such knowledge is unavailable – and it is increasingly unavailable given the dissipation of 
homogenuous social microcosms and the correlative decline of implicit social norms – ‘governing’ requires the 
deployment of new logics, strategies and tactics. My hypothesis is that the computational turn contributes to the 
renewal of these logics, strategies and tactics of government. 
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30 A project which would have seemed impossible to Spinoza. According to him, ‘one does not know what a 
body can do…’ See Spinoza (1990) and Deleuze (2003:28).  
31 In the context of machine learning, the ‘tests’ are not targeted at ‘bodies’ but at ‘data’.  
32 See, for example, Neyrat (2008). 
33 Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 318): ‘A body is only defined by longitude and latitude, that is, by the whole of 
material elements that belong to it under relations of movements and rest, speed and slowness (longitude), the 
whole of intensive affects it is capable of under a given power or degree of potency – or rather according to the 
limits of this degree.’ [My translation]  
34 My translation.  
35 See also Sarat (1995). 
36 For further elaboration of the idea that the common is both what is threatened by and the privileged resource 
for a critique of algorithmic rationality, Rouvroy (2012). 
37 The challenge also consists in finding a critical perspective after the decline of the concept of alienation. On 
this, see Haber (2007: 151). 
38 For further developments around this idea see Rouvroy (2011a). 
39 See Rouvroy (2011b).  
40 Nancy (2010: 12): ‘Le commun n’associe ni ne dissocie, il ne rassemble ni ne sépare, il n’est ni substance ni 
sujet. Le commun c’est que nous sommes – ce terme pris dans sa pleine teneur ontologique – dans le renvoi les 
uns aux autres (ici encore, laissons les autres existants). L’élément de ce renvoi est le langage. Celui-ci nous 
adresse les uns aux autres et nous adresse tous ensembles à ce qu’il fait essentiellement surgir : l’infini d’un sens 
que nulle signification ne remplit, et qui, cette fois disons-le, enveloppe avec les hommes la totalité du monde 
avec tous ses existants. (…) Le sens du monde n’est rien de garanti, ni de perdu d’avance : il se joue tout entier 
dans le commun renvoi qui nous est en quelque sorte proposé. Il n’est pas ‘sens’ en ce qu’il prendrait références, 
axiomes ou sémiologies hors du monde. Il se joue en ce que les existants – les parlants et les autres – y font 
circuler la possibilité d’une ouverture, d’une respiration, d’une adresse qui est proprement l’être-monde du 
monde.’ 
41 Artaud (2004:16) cited by Neyrat (2009: 54). 
42 My translation. 
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